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COMMENT
LIFTING THE FOG: ENDING FELONY
DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN VIRGINIA
The disenfranchisement of ex-felons had "its origin in
the fogs and fictions of feudal jurisprudence and doubt-
less has been brought forward into modern statutes with-
out fully realizing either the effect of its literal signifi-
cance or the extent of its infringement upon the spirit of
our system of government."
I. INTRODUCTION
The 2008 presidential election has been widely recognized as
one of historic proportions. With more than 130 million votes cast,
more Americans participated in this election than in any other
presidential contest in United States history.2 The surge was par-
ticularly pronounced in the Commonwealth of Virginia, as 67.6
percent of the estimated voting-eligible population showed up at
the polls to cast their ballots.3 Turnout among African American
voters was also unprecedented at sixty-eight percent, a whopping
sixteen points higher than in the 2004 election.4 Virginia's re-
markable turnout, which was ranked fifteenth highest in the na-
tion, far surpassed the national average of 62.2 percent.'
1. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 85-86 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Byers v. Sun Say. Bank, 139 P. 948, 949 (Okla. 1914)).
2. Andy Barr, 2008 Turnout Shatters All Records, POLITICO (Nov. 5, 2008, 4:19 AM),
http://www.politico.comlnews/stories/1108/15306.html.
3. 2008 General Election Turnout Rates, UNITED STATES ELECTION PROJECT, http:/
elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_2008G.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
4. Christopher Young, 2008 Presidential Election: Voter Turnout for Virginia, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH, July 21, 2009, http://www2.timesdispatch.com/news/2009/jul/21/2008-
presidential-electionvoterturnout for-virgi-ar-36615/.
5. UNITED STATES ELECTION PROJECT, supra note 3.
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A less-reported statistic is the number of Virginians who were
unable to cast a vote in that historic election because of a criminal
conviction. Currently, Virginia is one of only four states to per-
manently bar citizens from voting if they have been convicted of a
felony offense.' To reinstate voting rights in Virginia, a person
convicted of a felony must petition the governor for clemency, but
may do so only after he satisfies all sentencing requirements and
a mandatory waiting period, during which he must remain free of
further convictions! This state constitutional ban affects approx-
imately 378,000 Virginians, or 6.8 percent of Virginia's entire
population.8 Astonishingly, one out of every five African Ameri-
cans in the Commonwealth has lost his or her right to vote due to
a felony conviction.9
Most Virginia felony convictions (sixty percent) do not merit
jail time, and many are for nonviolent offenses." Yet those who
commit such infractions continue to be punished by society long
after they have paid the criminal penalties assigned to them. This
comment explores how Virginia's disenfranchisement law origi-
nated, how it has managed to survive throughout Virginia's his-
tory, and whether it may be vulnerable to various legal challeng-
es.
Part II outlines the history of felony disenfranchisement in
Virginia. Part III analyzes common policy justifications for the
current law and discusses the widely held beliefs about the role of
race in the law's inception. Part IV examines legal challenges to
similar laws in the federal courts and evaluates the potential for
success of comparable challenges in Virginia. Part V looks to re-
cent attempts at enacting solutions at the state level. Part VI of-
fers thoughts and recommendations for the future.
6. See Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws Across the United States, BRENNAN
CENTER FOR JUSTICE, http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-Democracy/USA%20MAP%
203.23.2011.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2012). The other states are Kentucky, Florida, and
Iowa. Id.
7. Monica Robbers, Ramifications of Felony Disenfranchisement on the Voting Popu-
lation in the Commonwealth of Virginia, 11 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 1, 3 (2008) (citing VA.
CODE. ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
8. See Virginia, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/map/
statedata.cfm?abbrev=VA&mapdata=true (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
9. See id.
10. See Edward Hailes, Jr., It's Time to Give Felons Back Their Right to Vote, WASH.
POST, July 27, 2008, at B8.
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II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
It is possible to trace the roots of felony disenfranchisement as
far back as ancient Greek civilization.1' In ancient Greece, con-
victed criminals essentially were cast out of society-they were
not allowed to vote, make speeches, attend public assemblies and
court proceedings, or serve in the army." However, the modern
American concept owes its origin to the British common law tra-
dition of "civil death."3 Through a process called "attainder," the
British government imposed various civil consequences on of-
fenders, which were collateral to their criminal convictions. 4 In
addition to losing the right to vote, convicts could neither transfer
nor inherit property under this policy.'5
Though American lawmakers generally rejected the policy of
complete civil death, they retained criminal disenfranchisement.6
Virginia was the first new American state to pass a law prevent-
ing persons with felony convictions from voting, but other states
soon followed. 7 By the eve of the Civil War, roughly twenty-four
states had some type of law restricting the suffrage of criminal of-
fenders.'" Some states have elected to suspend voting rights for
the length of incarceration or until all other requirements of the
sentence (parole, probation, fines, and restitution) have been sat-
isfied. 9 In contrast, Virginia's lifetime voting rights ban is one of
the strictest in the nation.'
Virginia's felony disenfranchisement provision is codified in ar-
ticle II, section 1 of the Virginia Constitution, which states, in
11. Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and 'The
Purity of the Ballot Box," 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 1301 (1989).
12. See id.
13. Carl N. Frazier, Note, Removing the Vestiges of Discrimination: Criminal Disen-
franchisement Laws and Strategies for Challenging Them, 95 KY. L.J. 481, 483 (2006-07).
14. Id.
15. Id. (citations omitted); see also Note, supra note 11, at 1301-02 (citations omitted)
(discussing the doctrine of "corruption of the blood" in feudal England, which denied crim-
inals the right to pass property because one's bad act was thought to reflect upon the
character of his entire family).
16. Frazier, supra note 13.
17. William Walton Liles, Comment, Challenges to Felony Disenfranchisement Laws:
Past, Present, and Future, 58 ALA. L. REV. 615, 617 (2007).
18. Id.
19. JOHN DINAN, THE VIRGINIA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 77 (G.
Alan Tarr, ed., 2006).
20. Id.
2012]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
pertinent part: "No person who has been convicted of a felony
shall be qualified to vote unless his civil rights have been restored
by the Governor or other appropriate authority."" Section 1,
which generally governs the qualifications of voters, has been
amended numerous times throughout history, and each revision
(with one exception in 1902) has had the effect of removing obsta-
cles to voting.22 However, the felony restriction essentially has
remained unchanged since its inception in 1830.23
III. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS
A. Theoretical Arguments
Supporters of felony disenfranchisement laws often base their
arguments on John Locke's social contract theory.24 The Second
Circuit articulated this justification in Green v. Board of Elec-
tions,25 one of the earlier cases to deal with denial of the franchise
to criminal offenders. According to Locke and the court, a social
contract is formed when an individual chooses to belong to and
participate in society.26 By virtue of their participation, all citi-
zens implicitly authorize society's government to make laws for
the public good and agree to abide by those laws." Therefore, if a
citizen breaks the law, it is reasonable to conclude that she has
abandoned any right to take part in further administration of the
contract. 8
Thus, the social contract theory reasons that the act of the in-
dividual, not the state, forecloses the free exercise of suffrage. It
"emphasizes the deliberate nature of the criminal's decision to
breach the social charter" and contrasts it with a passive govern-
ment institution.29 As the Sixth Circuit noted in another case, fel-
ony disenfranchisement provisions do not operate to deny citizens
21. VA. CONST. art. II, § 1.
22. DINAN, supra note 19, at 76. The 1902 Constitution imposed several restrictions
specifically aimed at disenfranchising African American voters, which have since been re-
pealed. See id.
23. Id. at 76-77.
24. See Note, supra note 11, at 1304.
25. 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967).
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Note, supra note 11, at 1304-05.
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their rights ab initio; rather, citizens themselves make the "con-
scious decision to commit a criminal act for which they assume
the risks."30
Critics of the social contract theory argue that this justifica-
tion, with its reliance on traditional contract principles, is simply
an inadequate way of describing the complex relationships be-
tween a society and its citizens. A contract requires a bargain, yet
if the citizenry were armed with complete information and actual
bargaining power vis-A-vis their government, they probably would
not consent to such a law.3 Furthermore, how many citizens
would be capable of fully understanding the life-long ramifica-
tions of a single breach from the moment they were able to com-
mit one? Finally, the theory plainly assumes away any democrat-
ic notion that a society's members have a right to participate in
the process that creates the laws with which they must comply."
Another argument in support of felony disenfranchisement is
that felons are unable to comprehend the public good and there-
fore should not be allowed to influence the political process.3 The
courts have used this notion of political competence to liken felo-
ny disenfranchisement to the widely accepted practice of denying
suffrage to minors and the mentally insane.34
Critics note that the competence justification is based on a
principle of exclusion, which is completely at odds with modern
social norms of integration and equality.35 The Supreme Court
has held that the government cannot exclude an entire segment
of the population based on the way they might vote, yet the com-
petence theory persists in doing just that. The Ninth Circuit
opined about this antiquated doctrine as long ago as 1972:
Search for modern reasons to sustain the old governmental disen-
franchisement prerogative has usually ended with a general pro-
nouncement that a state has an interest in preventing persons who
have been convicted of serious crimes from participating in the elec-
30. Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1262 (6th Cir. 1986).
31. See Note, supra note 11, at 1305.
32. See id. at 1306.
33. Id. at 1308.
34. Id. at 1307-08 (citing Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884); Kronlund v.
Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115
(5th Cir. 1978)).
35. Id. at 1309.
36. See id. (citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965)).
2012]
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toral process. or a quasi-metaphysical invocation that the interest
is preservation of the "purity of the ballot box."3 7
Any theory that assumes the commission of a single transgres-
sion makes a citizen morally deficient per se, and therefore an
undesirable voter for life, ignores the idea of rehabilitation upon
which our criminal justice system is founded.38 Surely, the mark
of success of any penal system is the ability of its criminals to be-
come productive members of society after serving their sentenc-
es. 9 Not only does the incompetence theory neglect this important
aim, it actually may work against it. Restoration of voting rights
is one of the easiest ways to facilitate the reintegration of former
delinquents into the community, and community involvement is
crucial for preventing recidivism.'
B. The Role of Race
Opponents of Virginia's felony disenfranchisement law often
cite racial discrimination, specifically a desire to prevent African
American citizens from voting, as the primary motivation for the
original enactment.41 After 1870, many Southern lawmakers re-
sponded to the passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments by creating new restrictions on voting-including poll tax-
es, literacy tests, and grandfather clauses-aimed at disenfran-
chising racial minorities. Around the turn of the century, some
Southern states also attempted to accomplish this goal by amend-
ing their criminal disenfranchisement provisions to "target
crimes for which African Americans were prosecuted most of-
ten."43 The effects of these changes were quite pronounced." In
Reconstruction-era Louisiana, forty-four percent of registered
37. Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 1972); see also Note, supra
note 11, at 1302.
38. Frazier, supra note 13, at 485.
39. See id.
40. See Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and
the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1166 (2004) (citation
omitted).
41. See, e.g., Rob Poggenklass, Op-Ed., Take Jim Crow Out of the Virginia Constitu-
tion: Restore Voting Rights for All, STATE OF ELECTIONS (Dec. 16, 2009), http://electls.
blogs.wm.edu12009/12/16/op-ed-take-jim-crow-out-of-the-virginia-constitution-restre-voti
ng-rights-for-all/.
42. Frazier, supra note 13, at 484.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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voters were African American, compared to less than one percent
in 1920.4r Likewise, in Mississippi, seventy percent of African
Americans were registered to vote in 1867, but by 1892, that per-
centage had fallen to less than six percent.46
Virginia's record of racial integration during this time in histo-
ry similarly was tainted by legislative efforts to keep African
American citizens from exercising the right to vote. Lawmakers
convened the now-infamous Constitutional Convention of 1901 to
1902 primarily with that specific purpose in mind.4" As Alfred P.
Thom, a delegate to the convention noted: 'We do not come here
prompted by an impartial purpose in reference to negro suffrage.
We come here to sweep the field of expedients for the purpose of
finding some constitutional method of ridding ourselves of it for-
ever."48 The delegates adopted a new system of voter registration
requirements, including, among other provisions, a poll tax and a
controversial "understanding" provision, under which individuals
must show "an ability to understand and explain any section of
the Constitution submitted to them by a registration officer. ' 9
It is not surprising that such an invidious history of using vot-
ing restrictions as a means to discriminate on the basis of race
would lead to the widely circulated assumption that Virginia's
felony disenfranchisement provision was enacted with the same
sentiment. However, that notion is not entirely accurate. This
particular law became part of the Virginia Constitution in 1830,
long before slavery was abolished and African Americans were
given the right to vote.5" Because the right did not yet exist, the
framers of the provision could not have manifested intent to deny
it.51
However, there is some evidence that lawmakers subsequently
attempted to tailor the felony disenfranchisement provision to
target African American voters. In 1876, an amendment was add-
45. Id. (citation omitted).
46. Id.
47. DINAN, supra note 19, at 15.
48. John Dinan, The Development of the Virginia Constitution, in THE
CONSTITUTIONALISM OF THE AMERICAN STATES 384, 389 (George E. Connor & Christopher
W. Hammons eds., 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. DINAN, supra note 19, at 16.
50. Howard v. Gilmore, No. 99-2285, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2680, at *2, *3 (4th Cir.
Feb. 23, 2000) (unpublished decision) (citing VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14 (1830)).
51. See id.
2012]
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ed to include "petit larceny" in the list of qualifying offenses,
which at the time also included election fraud, embezzlement,
and treason.5' This amendment clearly had the purpose of deny-
ing the vote to newly enfranchised African Americans; though,
when the Constitution was rewritten in 1971, the drafters re-
moved the tainted petit larceny provision as well as all other non-
felony offenses."
While Virginia's disenfranchisement provision may not have
been enacted with racial animus, and while the Commonwealth
has attempted to remedy the racially motivated amendments of
the Jim Crow era, one cannot ignore the actual disparate impact
the law has had on minority voters.54 By exploring potential legal
challenges in the federal courts in Part IV, I turn to the question
of whether solutions exist that could lead to a more equitable pol-
icy.
IV. CHALLENGES TO FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT UNDER
FEDERAL LAW
A. Equal Protection-The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
The first legal challenges to the constitutionality of felony dis-
enfranchisement laws claimed that such provisions violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.5 The Equal
Protection Clause dictates that no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 6 Plain-
tiffs thus argue that criminal disenfranchisement laws treat them
unequally by denying them the right to vote,57 which often is con-
sidered one of the most fundamental rights of our democracy.58
52. DINAN, supra note 19, at 92 n.2 (citations omitted).
53. Id. (citations omitted).
54. See supra text accompanying note 9.
55. Liles, supra note 17, at 618 (citing Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 26-27
(1974); Johnson v. Bush, 405 F.3d 1214, 1216 (1 1th Cir. 2005); Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d
25, 25-26 (3d Cir. 1983)).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
57. See, e.g., Richardson, 418 U.S. at 26-27.
58. See Frazier, supra note 13, at 481.
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1. Richardson and Its Critics
The Supreme Court first addressed the Equal Protection ar-
gument in Richardson v. Ramirez.9 The three original plaintiffs
in Richardson had prior felony convictions in California, but had
completed the requirements of their respective sentences." The
individuals were denied voter registration pursuant to a Califor-
nia law that required an executive pardon to restore voting rights
to anyone who was convicted of a felony and served a term in
prison as a result of that felony. 1 The plaintiffs then challenged
the law on two grounds. First, they claimed the law could not
withstand the strict scrutiny required under the Equal Protection
Clause." Second, they alleged that the law was unevenly applied
from county to county, which operated to deny due process and
equal protection across jurisdictions."
The Supreme Court held that although voting generally is con-
sidered a fundamental right, felony disenfranchisement could be
distinguished from other voting rights restrictions, because Sec-
tion 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly creates an excep-
tion for felony convictions.64 At the time the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was enacted, Section 2 imposed a penalty of decreased
congressional representation upon any state that denied fran-
chise to any qualified voters for any reason "except for participa-
tion in rebellion, or other crime."6 According to the Richardson
majority, because Section 2 expressly exempts felony disenfran-
chisement from sanction, the framers of the amendment could not
possibly have intended for Section 1 to prohibit it.66 Therefore, be-
cause they are affirmatively sanctioned by the Fourteenth
Amendment, felony disenfranchisement laws are patently consti-
tutional and not subject to strict scrutiny like other voting re-
strictions .67
59. 418 U.S. at 26-27.
60. Id. at 26.
61. Id. at 29-30.
62. Id. at 33.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 54.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
66. See 418 U.S. at 43.
67. See Frazier, supra note 13, at 489.
20121
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Justice Thurgood Marshall disagreed with the Richardson ma-
jority's interpretation of Section 2. In his dissent, he argues that
the legislative history of the amendment does not conclusively
demonstrate that its drafters intended to endorse the states' right
to disenfranchise voters based on prior convictions."8 Instead, he
posits that the section was really the product of Republicans in
Congress, who were worried that the addition of Southern states'
representatives in the legislature would "weaken their own politi-
cal dominance."69 African Americans in the South would have
been more sympathetic to Republican legislative priorities, so the
Republicans wanted to ensure their enfranchisement; however,
an explicit requirement of African American suffrage would have
been "politically unpalatable." ° Thus, Section 2 was a political
compromise, ironically intended to provide a remedy that would
expand the right to vote for African Americans during Recon-
struction. With that purpose in mind, Marshall suggests it is un-
likely that the drafters understood Section 2 to have the weight of
bestowing express unconditional authority to the states to limit
the right to vote guaranteed by other sections of the amend-
ment.71
Marshall goes on to suggest that any discrimination to which
the specific remedy of loss of representation in Section 2 does not
apply still must pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause."
Such discrimination is "not forever immunized from evolving
standards of equal protection scrutiny."" To illustrate his argu-
ment, Marshall notes that other voting requirements expressly
authorized by the framers at the time, such as the one-year resi-
dency requirement, have been subsequently declared unconstitu-
tional by the courts."
Other critics have cited structural objections to the Richardson
decision based on a holistic reading of all three "Civil War"
amendments to the Constitution. Such arguments note that the
68. 418 U.S. at 74 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also John Benjamin Schrader, Note,
Reawakening 'Privileges or Immunities" An Originalist Blueprint for Invalidating State
Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1293 (2009).
69. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 73 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (citations omitted).
71. See id. at 74.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 76.
74. Id. (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)).
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subsequent passage of the Fifteenth Amendment rendered the
penalty provision of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
practically obsolete. 5 The Fifteenth Amendment states that "[t]he
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude."7 Thus, because the Fif-
teenth Amendment imposes an absolute ban on disenfranchise-
ment for those classes listed, it creates a direct conflict with Sec-
tion 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which allows such disen-
franchisement, subject to the loss of representation penalty."7
Since the Fifteenth Amendment is the more recent enactment, it
has the practical effect of repealing Section 2.
Further, the Fifteenth Amendment may be read to prohibit fel-
ony disenfranchisement entirely, as it proscribes all restrictions
on the right to vote based on "previous condition of servitude. '8
Of course, this prohibition was drafted with former slaves and in-
dentured servants in mind, but the Framers chose not to include
an express authorization for disenfranchisement of former pris-
oners, as they had in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9
The language of the Thirteenth Amendment gives further cre-
dence to an interpretation of the phrase "previous condition of
servitude" that also applies to former prisoners. The Thirteenth
Amendment provides that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary ser-
vitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction."8 By including criminal
punishment within the definition of "involuntary servitude," the
Thirteenth Amendment "empower[s] the Fifteenth Amendment to
override" any sanction for felony disenfranchisement one may in-
terpret from the Fourteenth Amendment.8 '
Though Richardson's holding has been criticized widely by var-
ious scholars, it still represents the prevailing jurisprudence with
regard to facial Equal Protection challenges. Thus, the United
75. George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial
Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1903, 1904 (1999) (citations omitted).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
77. See Schrader, supra note 68, at 1294-95.
78. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
79. Compare id., with id. amend. XIV, § 2.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
81. Schrader, supra note 68, at 1295.
20121
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States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia has sus-
tained the Commonwealth's disenfranchisement provision
against such a challenge, citing the Richardson opinion.82 The
court went on to discuss the history of the law, noting that the
disenfranchisement provision was in the Virginia Constitution at
the time the Commonwealth was readmitted to the United States
after the end of the Civil War.8" Its readmission was conditioned
upon congressional review of the state constitution, so Congress
had the opportunity to reject the provision.84 The court observed,
"[i]f the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had intended to
preclude states like Virginia from disenfranchising their convict-
ed felons, they remained silent."'85
2. Beyond Richardson: Challenges Based on Discriminatory
Intent
In addition to their facial challenge to California's criminal dis-
enfranchisement provision, the plaintiffs in Richardson alleged
that the provision had been applied unevenly among different
counties within the state." They cited evidence from a report from
the secretary of state which admitted that county registrars
adopted different policies based on their own varied interpreta-
tions of the law." In fact, the problem was so widespread that "a
person convicted of almost any given felony would find that he is
eligible to vote in some California counties and ineligible to vote
in others."8
The Supreme Court refused to rule on the plaintiffs' claims of
discriminatory application of the law because the California Su-
preme Court, in holding that the law was itself unconstitutional,
had not yet taken up the issue. 9 However, the language the Court
used in declining to decide the issue left the lower courts room to
82. Perry v. Beamer, 933 F. Supp. 556, 558 (E.D. Va. 1996) (quoting Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974)).
83. See id. at 559.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 33.
87. Id. at 33 & n. 12.
88. Id. at 34 n.12.
89. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56; see also Liles, supra note 17, at 620.
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infer that such a challenge might have merit." This opened the
door for further actions in various circuits."
The issue again reached the Supreme Court in Hunter v. Un-
derwood, a case which challenged an Alabama constitutional pro-
vision barring individuals guilty of crimes of "moral turpitude"
from voting.92 The Court found that the provision would be viola-
tive of the Fourteenth Amendment if the plaintiffs could show not
only that it had a disproportionate impact on a protected class,
but also that it was enacted with discriminatory intent."
While some Equal Protection challenges to state felony disen-
franchisement laws based on discriminatory intent or application
have been successful, 4 the threshold to prove intentional discrim-
ination is a high bar to meet. Further, while one easily could
make a case that Virginia's law has had a practical discriminato-
ry impact on the African American voting age population, there is
no evidence that the law, in its current form, was enacted with a
discriminatory purpose. 5 Thus, as long as the Supreme Court's
ruling in Richardson remains an obstacle, a constitutional chal-
lenge based on the Fourteenth Amendment is unlikely to be suc-
cessful in the Commonwealth.
B. Voting Rights Act
Most recent challenges to state criminal disenfranchisement
laws have focused on section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
("VRA"). s6 Section 2 provides in part:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, prac-
tice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or politi-
cal subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement
of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of
97
race or color ....
90. Liles, supra note 17, at 620 & n.53 (citing Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56).
91. Id. at 620; see, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 677 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1982); Allen v. El-
lisor, 664 F. 2d 391 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot, 454 U.S. 807 (1981).
92. 471 U.S. 222, 223 (1985).
93. See id. at 232-33.
94. See, e.g., id. at 222.
95. See supra Part III.B.
96. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (1965) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006).
20121
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In 1982, Congress amended section 2 to abolish a requirement
that plaintiffs alleging discrimination under the VRA prove the
law was enacted with discriminatory intent.' Instead, the law, as
amended, forbids any voting procedure that has a discriminatory
impact on a protected class.99
1. Discriminatory Impact and Farrakhan
VRA challenges to state felony disenfranchisement laws seem
promising in light of the 1982 amendments, as statistics show
such provisions often disproportionately impact members of mi-
nority communities.'0 However, successful section 2 claims have
traditionally involved discrimination via government designation
of voting districts, and federal circuit courts disagree widely over
whether and how to apply section 2 prohibitions to felony disen-
franchisement."'
In the various VRA challenges that the courts have heard, the
Second Circuit and Eleventh Circuit have held that VRA claims
were invalid and therefore could not proceed, whereas the Sixth
Circuit and Ninth Circuit have found the opposite."°2 However, to
date, no law has been overturned based on a VRA violation."3 The
Supreme Court continues to refuse to resolve the circuit split (it
has denied certiorari to every case so far), and because the circuit
alignments are so strange, it can be difficult to predict what any
given court will rule on this issue.1M
To date, the most successful VRA challenge has been Farra-
khan v. Washington."' In Farrakhan, minority prison inmates
discovered research that showed that racial disparities in the
state criminal justice system did not adequately reflect the rate of
98. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2, 96 Stat. 131, 134
(1982) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)); see also Farrakhan v. Washing-
ton, 338 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 2003).
99. Id. at 1015.
100. Frazier, supra note 13, at 494-95 (citations omitted).
101. Id. at 495; see Liles, supra note 17, at 624.
102. Liles, supra note 17, at 627-28 (citing Johnson v. Bush, 405 F.3d 1214 (lth Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 650 (2005); Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th
Cir. 2003); Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996); Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255
(6th Cir. 1986)).
103. Id. at 628.
104. Id. at 627-28.
105. 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003).
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actual instances of minority crime." 6 When considered in light of
the fact that felony convictions automatically resulted in loss of
the right to vote, the plaintiffs argued that state law enforce-
ment's systemic inequalities naturally had a discriminatory im-
pact on their right to vote."'
The court held that challenges based on section 2 of the VRA
should be evaluated using a "totality of circumstances" inquiry."'
This standard requires courts to assess the ways in which the
challenged provision "interacts with external factors such as 'so-
cial and historical conditions' to result in denial of the right to
vote on account of race or color."'0 9 It found the plaintiffs had pro-
vided "compelling" evidence of discriminatory impact."'
After years of litigation and two separate appeals, the Ninth
Circuit decided to rehear Farrakhan en banc, which ultimately
resulted in reversal of both Ninth Circuit panel decisions.11 The
court introduced a new test to apply to VRA challenges, whereby
the plaintiff must at least show either: (i) that the criminal justice
system had been "infected by intentional discrimination" or (ii)
that the state's disenfranchisement provision was enacted with
discriminatory intent."' Though the court did not go so far as to
overrule the validity of the VRA challenge, it effectively read an
intent element back into section 2, thus ignoring the plain lan-
guage of the amended statute."'
In 2000, the Fourth Circuit addressed (and summarily rejected)
a VRA challenge to Virginia's felony disenfranchisement law in
the case of Howard v. Gilmore.11"' The court noted that a VRA
claim must show that the voting procedure either "intended to, or
had the effect of abridging or denying the right to vote based upon
race."'' It then held that the plaintiffs challenge failed to show
106. Ryan P. Haygood, Disregarding the Results: Examining the Ninth Circuit's
Heightened Section 2 "Intentional Discrimination" Standard in Farrakhan v. Gregoire, I11I
COLUM. L. REV. 51, 52-53 (2011).
107. Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at 1013.
108. Id. at 1011-12.
109. Id. (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986)).
110. Id. at 1013-14, 1020.
111. Haygood, supra note 106, at 56.
112. Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
113. See Haygood, supra note 106, at 57-58.
114. No. 99-2285, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2680 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2000) (unpublished).
115. Id. at *3 (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986)).
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racially discriminatory intent because the constitutional provi-
sion pre-dated minority enfranchisement."' Further, the plaintiff
failed to show "any nexus between the disenfranchisement of fel-
ons and race.
' 17
While the Virginia case ultimately failed, at least one aspect of
the Fourth Circuit panel's decision was encouraging: the court did
not reject the challenge on the ground that the VRA is not appli-
cable to felony disenfranchisement claims, as three of its sister
circuits have.118 Rather, it left open the possibility that a case may
arise in which the plaintiff, upon a showing of evidence of the re-
quired nexus, may succeed in exposing the discriminatory impact
of the law.
2. Minority Vote Dilution
A unique aspect of the VRA is that it also protects the equal
opportunity of members of a class to participate collectively in the
political process."' By its enactment, Congress seems to
acknowledge that the concept of voting rights implicates not only
those rights of an individual, but also the collective ability of a
community to join together to impact the political process.20 As
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., stated, "The concept of 'representa-
tion' necessarily applies to groups: groups of voters elect repre-
sentatives, individual voters do not."'
2
'
Felony disenfranchisement profoundly impacts the political op-
portunity available to minority communities. Using a procedure
called the "usual residence rule," the Census Bureau counts pris-
oners as residents of the district in which they are incarcerated. 2 '
The result is often artificially inflated population totals in rural,
majority white communities at the expense of the (largely minori-
ty) communities the inmates ordinarily would call home.123 Of
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Simmons v. Glavin, 575 F.3d 24, 41 (1st Cir. 2009); Johnson v. Bush, 405 F.3d
1214, 1234 (11th Cir. 2005); Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 115 (2d Cir. 2004).
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006).
120. See Karlan, supra note 40, at 1155-56.
121. Id. at 1156 (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 167 (1986) (Powell, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part)).
122. Id. at 1159.
123. Id. at 1159-60.
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course, government funding and political representation are both
functions of population, as determined by the Census, so the in-
mates quite literally increase the value of prison communities
without reaping any of the benefits, while leaving their families
and neighbors underrepresented. Critics of this system have
compared its practical effects to the "Three-Fifths" Compromise
in the original United States Constitution, which gave slave-
owning states more political influence by including slaves in the
population tallies for determining congressional representation.
24
The effects of this type of vote dilution could be particularly
prominent in a state like Virginia, where criminal voting bans are
not rescinded automatically. As more (disproportionately minori-
ty) voters become disenfranchised, and comparatively few rejoin
the political process, the distribution of political power becomes
increasingly disparate. The decrease in political power leads to
lack of resources, which in turn leads to more crime, and a vicious
cycle develops, one with little chance of reform.2 Thus, Virginia's
criminal disenfranchisement laws operate as a collective sanction,
penalizing not only the offenders, but everyone in the communi-
ty. As 2012 marks the first presidential election since the latest
Census tally, clearer measures of the precise impacts of these pol-
icies likely are to become available soon.
C. Eighth Amendment
Laws like Virginia's, which prohibits voting long after the sen-
tence is complete, result in criminal defendants who continue to
pay in some form, even after their "debt to society" has officially
been settled.'27 These effects have prompted some critics to argue
that the laws violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. 2'
The Eighth Amendment test begins with a determination of
whether a government action is penal or regulatory in nature, as
regulatory actions are not subject to Eighth Amendment scruti-
124. Id. at 1160-61.
125. See, e.g., ELIZABETH A. HULL, THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF EX-FELONS 27 (2006).
126. Karlan, supra note 40, at 1161.
127. Frazier, supra note 13, at 492.
128. Id.
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ny.'29 The purpose of a penal provision is punishment, reprimand,
or deterrence, while a non-penal provision is motivated by some
other legitimate government purpose.' To illustrate the differ-
ence, Chief Justice Earl Warren used a hypothetical example of a
felony disenfranchisement provision as "a non-penal exercise of
the power to regulate the franchise.""' Warren gives no further
explanation as to the "legitimate government purpose" served by
such a law, yet courts have since relied on that one-line charac-
terization, and thus never have conducted an Eighth Amendment
analysis on the subject.132
Given the fact that courts have yet to entertain the notion that
felony disenfranchisement provisions are more akin to punish-
ments than regulations, such a case would be difficult to make. 33
However, much of the relevant scholarship on the issue suggests
that these statutes do in fact penalize.' Furthermore, as courts
have an affinity for citing congressional acts to readmit the
Southern states to the Union as evidence that the framers of the
Civil War Amendments approved of felony disenfranchisement,
they should also take note that these statutes view such disen-
franchisement as a punishment. 3 ' The "Act to admit the State of
Virginia to Representation in the Congress of the United States"
states that, as a condition of admittance to the Union:
[T]he Constitution of Virginia shall never be so amended or changed
as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States of
the right to vote who are entitled to vote by the Constitution herein
recognized, except as a punishment for such crimes as are now felo-
nies at common law, whereof they shall have been duly convicted
under laws equally applicable to all the inhabitants of said State. 13
6
If one were successful in convincing a court that felony disen-
franchisement laws are primarily punitive, the next step would
be to show the provisions are cruel and unusual. The test itself is
not static; rather, courts use a measure of the "evolving standards
129. Id.
130. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958) (citations omitted).
131. Id. at 96-97.
132. See Karlan, supra note 40, at 1150; Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 450
(2d Cir. 1967).
133. See, e.g., 380 F.2d at 449-50; Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73-74 (N.D.
Ga. 1971).
134. Karlan, supra note 40, at 1150; Frazier, supra note 13, at 493-94.
135. See Perry v. Beamer, 933 F. Supp. 556, 559 (E.D. Va. 1996).
136. Act of Jan. 26, 1870, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 62.
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of decency" to determine what is cruel and unusual."7 One easily
could argue that America's standards have evolved to the point
where the continued disenfranchisement of convicted persons af-
ter their release and parole no longer is acceptable. Over eighty
percent of the general public now opposes revoking the right to
vote for life.138 In light of such strong public opinion, the extended
length of rights deprivation in the Commonwealth, and the bur-
densome procedures for restoring the right (at least among vio-
lent and drug-related felonies), 9 the time may be right for Vir-
ginia courts to reassess its standards.
V. STATE LAW SOLUTIONS
Though Virginia's constitutional voting restrictions have not
evolved significantly over the years, the restoration process has
become more easily navigable, thanks to the efforts of Virginia
governors throughout the past decade. In 2002, Governor Mark
Warner streamlined the process for non-violent, non-drug-related
offenders by shortening the required application from thirteen
cumbersome pages to one.4 Governor Warner also reduced the
waiting period for these comparatively minor offenders from five
years to three, and rescinded the requirement that they submit
three letters of reference with their application.' Governor Bob
McDonnell further streamlined the process, reducing the waiting
period for non-violent offenders to two years and shortening an
application's administrative turnaround time to sixty days.
In contrast, the restoration process for violent offenders, drug
offenders, and individuals convicted of election fraud remains ar-
duous. In these cases, the applicant must submit: (i) a completed,
notarized twelve-page application, (ii) certified copies of all felony
sentencing orders and proof of payment of all fines, restitution,
137. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
138. Liles, supra note 17, at 628.
139. See supra notes 136-37 & accompanying text.
140. Ryan S. King, Expanding the Vote: State Felony Disenfranchisement Reform,
1997-2008, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 27 (2008), http:/Iwww.sentencingproject.org/doc/
publications/fd statedisenfranchisement.pdf.
141. Id. See also Robbers, supra note 7, at 7 (detailing previous eligibility require-
ments).
142. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor McDonnell Announces Restora-
tion of Civil Rights Procedures (May 20, 2010), available at www.governor.virginia.gov
news/viewRelease.cfm?id=183 [hereinafter Press Release].
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and court costs, (iii) a letter from the applicant's most recent pa-
role or probation officer describing the period of supervision, (iv) a
signed petition letter, (v) three letters of recommendation from
"reputable citizens," and (vi) a letter to the governor detailing the
circumstances of the offense and resulting sentence, as well as
any community service or other information that would help show
why rights should be restored. '43 Furthermore, the applicant must
wait five years from the time he completes his sentence, during
which time he must remain free of misdemeanors and any other
pending convictions.'44
The simpler application processes have resulted in rights resto-
ration for a record number of Virginias over the last ten years.
Governor Tim Kaine restored more rights for residents with felo-
ny convictions than any other Virginia governor at 4402 restora-
tions over the years 2006 to 2010, followed by Governor Warner,
who restored rights for 3486 individuals from 2002-2006."5 Gov-
ernor McDonnell, Virginia's sitting governor, restored rights for
more than 1100 offenders in his first year in office, which places
him on pace to meet or exceed Governor Kaine's totals.1"6
Recently, various civil rights organizations have asked the gov-
ernor to go a step further by issuing an executive order providing
for automatic restoration of rights to "most or all felons in Virgin-
ia who have completed their sentences."'47 Because the governor
has plenary authority "to remove political disabilities consequent
upon conviction for offenses committed," ' 8 this method could ef-
143. FIVE-YEAR APPLICATION FOR RESTORATION OF RIGHTS, VA. SEC'Y OF THE
COMMONWEALTH, http://www.commonwealth.virginia.gov/judicialsystemclemency/5-Year
RoRApplication-UpdatedJuly20lO-2.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
144. Id.
145. Anita Kumar, More Va. Felons Get Rights Restored, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2010,
at C4. Governors of the past ten years have made particularly great strides when com-
pared to the enfranchisement efforts of previous governors. See id. Governor James Gil-
more and Governor George Allen, who both served in the 1990s, restored rights for 238
and 460 ex-felons, respectively. Id.
146. Olympia Meola, 1,100 Felons Regain Rights in McDonnell's First Year, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar, 9, 2011, at Al. While these numbers indicate the restoration pro-
gram currently is more effective than in years past, the Commonwealth has a long way to
go to make a meaningful impact on its disenfranchised population, which still comprises
more than 375,000 Virginians. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 8.
147. Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Groups Ask Governor to Issue Executive
Order Restoring Voting Rights of Virginians with Felony Convictions (Jan. 5, 2010), avail-
able at http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice-voting-rights/groups-ask-governor-issue-executi
ve-order-restoring-voting-rights-virgi.
148. VA. CONST. art. V, § 12.
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fectively bypass the General Assembly and the constitutional
amendment process. Such an avenue would be a quick and cost-
effective way of achieving the goal of enfranchisement, if the gov-
ernor were willing to make such a bold political move. 4 9
The Virginia legislature also has taken measures to facilitate
rights restoration for individuals with felony convictions where
they were convicted or in their current place of residence, for res-
toration of voter eligibility. 50 If the court approves an individual's
petition, it must then communicate its order to the secretary of
the Commonwealth subject to the approval or denial of the peti-
tion by the governor.' This provision provides additional conven-
ience to the applicants, who may find it easier to access the court
system where they were convicted than to navigate the state ad-
ministrative process.
The General Assembly also has enacted legislation that re-
quires the Virginia Department of Corrections to give notice to all
convicted persons of the loss of their rights. Furthermore, upon
completion of the individual's incarceration, probation, or parole,
the department must inform him or her of the specific processes
required to restore those rights."'
Other efforts by the General Assembly have not been so suc-
cessful. On multiple occasions, it has proposed an amendment to
the Virginia Constitution to expressly permit the legislature to
provide for the automatic restoration of voting rights for nonvio-
lent offenders."4 Additionally, legislators have introduced legisla-
tion that would bypass the amendment process altogether, and
149. See Press Release, supra note 142. In 2005, Iowa Governor Tom Vilsack used this
method to get around Iowa's similar constitutional disenfranchisement provision. Wendy
R. Weiser & Lawrence Norden, Voting Law Changes in 2012, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE
35 (2011), available at http:/fbrennan.3edn.net/92635ddafbcO9egd88_i3m6bjdeh.pdf. As a
result, Iowa restored rights to more than 80,000 of its citizens from 2005 to 2011. Id. How-
ever, Republican Governor Terry Branstad rescinded the order immediately after taking
office last year, returning Iowa to the company of Virginia and the few other states which
impose a lifetime ban. Id. at 34-35.
150. H.B. 1080, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 9, 2000, ch.
969, 2000 Va. Acts 2136).
151. Id.
152. See DINAN, supra note 19, at 78.
153. Ch. 969, 2000 Va. Acts 2136.
154. See S.J. Res. No. 273, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009); DINAN, supra note 19,
at 77.
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simply enact a procedure for restoring rights to individuals con-
victed of non-violent felonies upon completion of their sentenc-
es.
The Constitution currently allows rights to be restored "by the
Governor or other appropriate authority."'5 6 While various state
attorneys general have held consistently that the meaning of the
phrase "other appropriate authority" is limited to "the President
of the United States, other governors, and pardoning boards with
such authority,"'' some members of the General Assembly have
disagreed. In Senate Bill 254, which was introduced in 2000, the
patrons included specific findings in support of an alternative
reading of the provision.' The findings asserted that, as a matter
of statutory construction, "a specific grant of authority in this
Constitution upon a subject shall not work a restriction" on the
authority of the legislature; therefore, a grant of the Governor's
clemency power to restore voting rights does not limit the author-
ity of the General Assembly.' Further, the findings state that
because the phrase "other appropriate authority" has been inter-
preted by the Executive Branch to honor the voting rights and
restoration statutes of other states, it also may be properly con-
strued to include statutes passed in the Commonwealth. 60 Thus,
the debate is ongoing as to whether the state legislature may pass
a law with respect to the restoration of voting rights for persons
with felony convictions as a proper exercise of its legislative pow-
161
ers.
VI. CONCLUSION
Strategies for challenging Virginia's outdated felony disenfran-
chisement provisions will depend largely on the balance between
available resources, ease of implementation, and chances of suc-
cess. Court challenges are costly, and litigation could take years.
In light of the Fourth Circuit's jurisprudence, mounting a suc-
155. H.B. 16, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2012); S.B. 254, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg.
Sess, 2000); H.B. 2065, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999).
156. VA. CONST. art. II, § 1.
157. 1999 Va. Op. Atty. Gen. 48; see also 1999 Va. Op. Atty. Gen. 50; 1979-80 Va. Op.
Atty. Gen. 153; 1976-77 Va. Op. Atty. Gen. 201.
158. S.B. 254, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. SeeVA. CONST. art. IV, § 14.
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cessful challenge would likely be an uphill battle. However, there
are some potential cases to be made using the theory of minority
vote dilution under the VRA or even the Eighth Amendment.
Furthermore, any successes in the courts would have greater
chances of providing lasting benefits, as legislative enactments or
executive orders can be easily overturned.
In the meantime, while developing and testing strategies for
long-term solutions, the Commonwealth can and should provide
rapid and effective relief for disenfranchised non-violent offenders
who have paid their debts to society. It can help ameliorate the
negative impacts of the law by further streamlining and stand-
ardizing the restoration process. Applications for rights restora-
tion should use the least restrictive means possible, and the state
should provide free assistance to help applicants understand and
navigate every step of the process."2
Dori Elizabeth Martin *
162. Frazier, supra note 13, at 502-03.
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